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Abstract: What does it mean to understand something? I approach this question
by comparing understanding with knowledge. Like knowledge, understanding
comes, at least prima facia, in three varieties: propositional, interrogative and
objectual. I argue that explanatory understanding (this being the most important
form of interrogative understanding) and objectual understanding are not reduci-
ble to one another and are neither identical with, nor even a form of, the
corresponding type of knowledge (nor any other type of knowledge). My discus-
sion suggests that definitions of the concepts of explanatory and of objectual
understanding must include a commitment condition, a grasping condition, an
answering-the-facts condition, and an epistemically internal justification condi-
tion, but no further external anti-luck condition. On this basis I argue against
reducing explanatory understanding to propositional understanding, and in fa-
vour of identifying propositional understanding with propositional knowledge.
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Epistemology is usually conceived of as the theory of knowledge, concerned with
the nature, sources and limits of knowledge. Knowledge is identified with propo-
sitional knowledge and analysed in terms of justified or reliably generated true
belief, perhaps extended by a further condition designed to avoid Gettier counter-
examples. However, epistemology’s focus on propositional knowledge has re-
cently been challenged. There is a growing insight that understanding, rather
than propositional knowledge, is our main cognitive goal. Once we acknowledge
the central role of understanding, authors have argued, we will be better able to
accommodate science within epistemology (Elgin 1996; 2007), identify the intel-
lectual virtues (Zagzebski 2001; Riggs 2003), avoid the value problem for knowl-
edge (Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard 2010), and defend morality against the egoist (Hills
2010). These potential roles for the concept of understanding have been widely
discussed, but few epistemologists have made serious efforts to deal with the
nature of understanding. In this paper, I analyse what it means to understand
something by comparing understanding with knowledge.
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There are two standard views regarding the relation between understanding
and knowledge. Outside epistemology, particularly in the philosophy of science,
the standard view is that understanding is a form of knowledge (Salmon 1993;
Woodward 2003; Lipton 2004; Grimm 2006). Within epistemology, the standard
view is that understanding is neither identical with nor a form of knowledge
(Zagzebski 2001; Kvanvig 2003; Elgin 2007; Hills 2010; Pritchard 2010). This
debate, however, has not always given due acknowledgement of the fact that, at
least prima facia, both understanding and knowledge come in three varieties.
While accepting that ordinary language is not always a reliable guide, we may
appeal to it here as a means of classifying these varieties in terms of the gramma-
tical form of the ascription: if the ascription of understanding or knowledge uses
a “that” clause, it is propositional; if it uses a “wh-” clause, it is interrogative; and
if it uses a noun phrase, it is objectual. Zagzebski (2001), for instance, leaves it
unclear which type of understanding she is comparing with which type of knowl-
edge; Kvanvig (2003) and Elgin (2007) contrast different types, notably objectual
understanding and propositional knowledge; Grimm (2006), Pritchard (2010),
Hills (2010) and most philosophers of science consider only certain types, notably
explanatory understanding and knowledge (i.e. the most important form within
the interrogative category).
Questions regarding the nature of understanding and its relation to knowledge
must thus be answeredwith respect to different types of understanding and knowl-
edge. I therefore proceed, first, by providing a division of understanding by
delimiting and characterizing the uses of “understand” that are relevant for my
project (Sect. 1). With respect to explanatory and objectual understanding, I then
argue that these are not reducible to one another, and are neither identical with,
nor even a form of, the corresponding type of knowledge – or indeed any of the
other forms of knowledge (Sects. 2 and 3). My discussion reveals important char-
acteristics of these two types of understanding, which suggest that definitions of
the concepts of explanatory and of objectual understanding must include a “com-
mitment” condition, a “grasping” condition, an “answering-the-facts” condition
and an “epistemically internal justification” condition, but not a further “external
anti-luck” condition (Sect. 4). Finally, I turn to propositional understanding and
argue against reducing explanatory understanding to it, but in favour of identify-
ing it with propositional knowledge (Sect. 5).
1 The division of understanding
The expressions “to understand” and “understanding” are used in a variety of
ways. Let me begin by providing some examples; these fall into three groups,
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depending on the grammatical form of the attribution of understanding. In its
verb form, we can give examples such as:
(1) You understand why the global mean temperature has increased.
(2) He understands what justice demands.
(3) They understand how the machine works.
(4) She understands global warming.
(5) You understand that the train leaves in an hour.
(6) I understand that you are angry with me.
In its noun form, we can give examples such as:
(7) My understanding was that you would get the job.
(8) They came to an understanding on when the final payment was to be made.
(9) Each of us has an understanding as well as a will and a sensibility.
In its adjectival form, we can give examples such as:
(10) She has very understanding parents.
Some usages are irrelevant to epistemology. For instance, I can say “I under-
stand” to hedge an assertion or to moderate its force (Elgin 2007: 34). I might
utter (6) when I have some reason to think that you are angry with me, but am not
wholly convinced of the truth of the claim. In such a hedging use, “I understand”
indicates a refraining from a full-blown claim to epistemic warrant. Hedging
usages bear important connections to noun forms such as in (7), where speaking
of someone’s understanding of something being such-and-such is compatible
with their being (largely) wrong. Alternatively, I might utter (6) when I know that
you are angry with me and I try to remedy the situation by signalling that I can see
some reason for your anger. In such a moderating use, “I understand” indicates
my sympathetic awareness of your feelings and invites you to resolve your anger.
Moderating usages are related to adjectival forms such as in (10), where “under-
standing” means “sympathetic”. Furthermore, “understanding” can be used to
express an informal agreement, as in (8). Hence we are left with the verb forms
in (1) to (5) and the noun form in (9) as examples of epistemologically relevant
usage.
Within the epistemologically relevant usages we can distinguish between
usages referring to understanding as a faculty, as a process, and as the result of a
process. In (9) “understanding” refers to a cognitive faculty in an inclusive sense
consisting of various cognitive abilities. (1) to (5) can either be read as referring to
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the process of coming to understand by making use of cognitive abilities, or,
perhaps more naturally, as referring to an understanding that is the result of such
a process. In both readings, “to understand” is a verb of success. Unless the usage
in question is a hedging usage, to say that someone understands something
means that she understands it (more or less) correctly. In what follows, I use the
term to imply cognitive success with regard to the result. This is the usage that is
relevant for comparing understanding and knowledge, since “knowledge” does
not refer to a faculty and is hardly used to refer to a process.
The object of understanding can either be some worldly item or a symbolic
representation thereof. Understanding some fact, event or subject matter I call
“factual understanding”; understanding a symbolic representation – such as a
sentence, explanation, diagram or theory – I call “symbolic understanding”.1
Factual and symbolic understanding have to be kept apart, since the symbolic
representation which in the second case is the object of understanding is in the
first case its vehicle; that is, the means by which one understands some object.
One can understand a sentence, explanation, diagram or theory without commit-
ting oneself to it and regardless of whether it is true or accurate; but this does not
hold for an understanding of what it represents. Understanding a subject matter
by means of a theory, for instance, presupposes that one commits oneself to the
theory and that it is broadly correct. That is why you can understand phlogiston
theory, but you cannot understand combustion in terms of it. Symbolic under-
standing is a precondition for factual understanding whenever the latter is symbo-
lically conveyed. Nonetheless, as an epistemologist I am primarily concerned with
factual understanding. Symbolic and, more specifically, linguistic understanding
are the subjects of semiotics and the philosophy of language, respectively.
In ascriptions of understanding in its verbal form, “to understand” is either
followed by a “wh-” clause, a noun phrase or a “that” clause. The three gramma-
tical forms of the ascriptions of understanding are usually taken to constitute
three types of understanding. Ascriptions employing a “wh-” clause ascribe
interrogative understanding, which includes, for example, understanding why,
what and how, as in (1) to (3); ascriptions employing a noun phrase ascribe
objectual understanding, as in (4); and ascriptions employing a “that” clause
ascribe propositional understanding, as in (5) (cf. Grimm 2011: 84–8). In exactly
the same manner, there is also interrogative, objectual and propositional knowl-
edge. Moreover, in all verb form examples (1) to (5), we can substitute “under-
1 I prefer “symbolic understanding” to “semantic understanding” (Cooper 1994: 1–2) or “linguis-
tic understanding” (Grimm 2011: 84), since it may concern syntactic and pragmatic aspects (such
as syntactic ambiguity and illocutionary roles) as well as semantic ones, and non-verbal symbols
(such as diagrams, graphs, maps and three-dimensional models) as well as verbal ones.
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stands” with “knows” without turning the sentences into manifest nonsense.2
However, this does not settle my question regarding the relations between the
different types of understanding and knowledge, since it does not imply that the
sentences do not change their meaning thereby; knowing a person, for instance,
is not the same as understanding her.
The different grammatical forms of ascriptions of understanding do not
directly deliver a useful typology of understanding. Too many “wh-” clauses can
be substituted by a clause entailing another interrogative, or even by a noun
phrase or a “that” clause. “You understand why the global mean temperature has
increased”, for instance, can be paraphrased as “You understand what the causes
of global warming are”, as well as “You understand the causes of global warming”
or, perhaps, as “You understand that the global mean temperature has increased
because… .”As a starting point for developing amore stable typology, for paradig-
matic cases of each prima facie type, we may ask what the object and what the
vehicle is. In paradigmatic cases of understanding-why – the only interrogative
form I consider –, the vehicle is an explanation that answers the why-question and
the object is a phenomenon like an event (e.g. rise of temperature); understand-
ing-why, then, is explanatory understanding. In paradigmatic cases of objectual
understanding, the vehicle is a more comprehensive body of information, such as
a whole theory or account, and the object is a subject matter (e.g. global warming),
a topic (e.g. justice) or a system (e.g. a machine).3 In the case of propositional
understanding, the vehicle is a proposition, and the object is a fact (e.g. that the
temperature has increased).
Since it is rare to talk of understanding that something is the case – and if we
do, “understands” often has a hedging connotation that suggests an openness to
correction – I first focus on explanatory and on objectual understanding, and
subsequently draw some conclusions frommy discussion regarding propositional
understanding.
2 However, in objectual cases in which the object is a complete subject matter as in (4), “under-
stands” seems more natural than “knows”; “She knows global warming”, for instance, sounds
slightly odd.
3 Ascriptions of objectual understanding that do not relate to a comprehensive body of informa-
tion may arguably be interpreted as elliptical for the corresponding ascriptions of interrogative
understanding. For instance, “She understands his action” can mean “She understands what
kind of action he has performed” or “She understands why he did what he did”, and so on.
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2 Explanatory understanding
Understanding is a form of knowledge if it implies knowledge; in order to be
identical with knowledge it additionally needs to be implied by knowledge. I first
argue that it is possible to know that and even why p without understanding why
p; hence, that explanatory understanding is equivalent neither to propositional
knowledge nor to explanatory knowledge (Sect. 2.1). I then argue that it is
possible to understand why p without knowing why p; hence, that explanatory
understanding is not even a form of knowledge (Sect. 2.2).
2.1 Knowledge without understanding
Obviously, you can know that p without understanding why p. Suppose a climate
scientist tells you that the global mean temperature has increased since the
middle of the 20th century. If he is right, and you have good reasons to believe in
his reliability, you know that the global mean temperature has increased. But as
long as you have no idea what the causes of global warming are, you do not
understand why the global mean temperature has increased.
One might object that this only shows that you can know that p without
knowing why p, but not that you can know why p without understanding why p.
Most philosophers of science identify understanding with explanatory knowl-
edge. According to Lipton, for instance, “[u]nderstanding is not some sort of
super-knowledge, but simply more knowledge: knowledge of causes” (Lipton
2004: 30). However, if we slightly modify this testimony case, it shows that even
knowing why p does not imply understanding why p (cf. Pritchard 2010: 81).
Suppose your climate scientist explains to you that the global mean temperature
has increased mainly due to increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases. If he
is right, and you have good reason to believe him to be reliable, then you know
why the global mean temperature has increased. But as long as you have no grasp
of how increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases can cause global warming,
and you only have testimonial evidence for the given explanation, you do not
understand why the global mean temperature has increased.
This example suggests two ways in which explanatory understanding differs
from explanatory knowledge.4 First, while explanatory knowledge involves a
4 Pritchard (2010: 81–2) does not clearly keep apart these two distinctions between explanatory
understanding and explanatory knowledge, nor does he elaborate them; Hills (2010: 192–3)
elaborates the first but does not recognize the second.
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correct belief about what the causes or reasons for something are, explanatory
understanding additionally involves some grasp of these causes or reasons,
including their relation to what they are causes or reasons for. If q is the cause or
reason why p, then, when you know why p, you correctly believe that p because
q. When you understand why p, you additionally have a grasp of how p causally
or otherwise depends on q. Second, explanatory understanding requires a justifi-
cation in a more demanding sense than explanatory knowledge does. When you
know by testimony that p because q, the only reason you may be able to provide
for your belief is that a reliable expert has told you so. When you understand why
p, you have reflectively accessible grounds in favour of your explanation and are
thus able to justify it by citing those reasons.
Talking of grasping causes or reasons, however, is only a metaphor. An
obvious suggestion for spelling it out would be that grasping how p depends on q
is equivalent to correctly believing that p because q, combined with having a
so-called “aha” feeling. Understanding is indeed often accompanied by such a
feeling. But having an “aha” feeling is not necessary for explanatory understand-
ing; you do not need to have a particular feeling when you finally come to
understand why p. Having an “aha” feeling is not even sufficient for understand-
ing why p if you know why p. However strong your feeling of revelation may be
when you know that p because q, you do not understand why p if you are not able
to explain how p depends on q, and are thereby unable to say what would have
been the case if factors cited in q had been different in various ways.
The metaphor of grasping the causes or reasons why p, then, is better spelled
out in terms of having certain abilities that are not required for simply believing
that the factors in question are the causes or reasons why p. Modifying a sugges-
tion by Hills (2010: 194–5), let us say that if you understand why p (where q is why
p), then you are (to some extent) able (i) to comprehend and render an explanation
of p which shows (e.g. bymeans of a generalization) how p depends on q, (ii) draw
the conclusion that p (or that probably p) from the information that q, and (iii) for
some p* and q*, similar but not identical to p and q, draw the conclusion that p*
(or probably that p*) from the counterfactual assumption that q*, and, counter-
factually assuming that p*, explain it with the help of q*.5 Knowledge also
involves having certain abilities. Even knowing by testimony why the global mean
temperature has increased requires the ability to quote the explanation given by
5 To demand, as Khalifa (2011a) does, that q is the best available explanation for p is too
demanding in one respect and not demanding enough in another. A good explanation can
provide some understanding of why p, even if it is not the best explanation; but an understanding
providing explanation must also show how p depends on the factors specified in q. As a result,
understanding why p cannot even be identified with knowing that q is the best explanation for p.
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the scientist. However, since you can know why p without having all of the
abilities (i)–(iii), understanding why p is not the same as knowingwhy p.
Consider a possible objection. In contrast to propositional knowledge, expla-
natory knowledge is gradual. It hardly makes sense to say that I know that it is
raining better than you do; but it certainly makes sense to say that your knowl-
edge why the global mean temperature has increased is better than mine. Minimal
knowledge why p may be equivalent to knowing that p because q; but good (or
deep or comprehensive) knowledge why p involves knowing each of a whole set
of true propositions, including propositions about how p depends on q and that if
q* rather than q were true, then p* rather than p would be true. In the modified
testimony case above, you have minimal knowledge why p without understand-
ing why p; but understanding why p is the same as good knowledge why p.
Furthermore, since explanatory understanding is also gradual, one might even
claim that, in the testimony case, you have some minimal understanding why p,
and that minimal understanding and minimal knowledge why p are equivalent,
as are good understanding and good knowledge why p.
Notice that only the bolder claim at the end of the objection contradicts the
thesis I defend in this section, namely that it is possible to know why p without
understanding why p. So let me address it first. The modified testimony case
suggests that even minimal explanatory understanding involves some grasp of
howpdependsonq, and, hence, involvespossessing to someextent theabilities (i)
to (iii). This rather demanding concept of understanding sensibly complements our
concept of knowledge, which does not require having all of these abilities. You can
know that the global temperature has increased because of increasing concentra-
tions of greenhouse gases, but be unable to explain by means of a generalization
how global warming depends on greenhouse gas concentrations and thus be
unable to saywhatwould have been the case if these concentrations did increase to
agreater or lesser extent. Youmayevenbeunable to infer in some substantial sense
that the global mean temperature has increased from the information that green-
house gas concentrations have increased if this involves going through an argu-
ment which connects greenhouse gas concentrations and global warming by a
generalization stating how the latter depends on the former. As a result, you can
have minimal explanatory knowledge without minimal explanatory understand-
ing. This suffices to defend my thesis. Moreover, good explanatory understanding
may involve further abilities that are not required for good explanatory knowledge.
A good understanding why the global mean temperature has increased may, for
example, – like the objectual understanding of global warming (see Sect. 3) –
involve being able to develop emission scenarios and use them in order to predict
future concentrations of greenhouse gases. If so, then you can have good explana-
tory knowledge without good explanatory understanding.
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According to the weaker claim in the objection, explanatory understanding is
identical with good explanatory knowledge. This claim allows that explanatory
understanding is not the same as minimal explanatory knowledge, since it
involves the abilities (i) to (iii), but it objects that having these abilities is simply
to have further knowledge, such as knowledge how p depends on q, and that if q*
rather than q were true then p* rather than p would be true. Understanding why p
would then be a combination of minimal knowledge why p and some further
knowledge. However, having these abilities is not the same as having extra pieces
of knowledge, since you might have the further knowledge without being able to
apply it to new situations nor being able to judge all kinds of counterfactual cases
with its help (cf. Hills 2010: 195–6). If so, then you can have good explanatory
knowledge without even minimal explanatory understanding. Of course, the
objection might simply claim that good explanatory knowledge involves the
abilities (i) to (iii) without trying to reduce them to further pieces of knowledge. If
so, then having good explanatory knowledge is indeed sufficient for having
explanatory understanding, but it is still not necessary for it – or so I argue in my
next section.
2.2 Understanding without knowledge
Pritchard and Hills argue that cases involving epistemic luck show that it is
possible to understand why p even while failing to know why p (Pritchard 2010:
78–9; Hills 2010: 106). If they are right, explanatory understanding is not even a
form of explanatory knowledge.
Consider a case of what Pritchard calls “environmental epistemic luck”,
where the luckiness of one’s true belief is entirely due to the fact that one is in an
epistemically unfriendly environment. Suppose you study a reliable book and
thereby acquire some understanding why the global mean temperature has
increased. Suppose further that all other books about global warming are very
unreliable but superficially just as scholarly, so that it is only by chance that you
have chosen the reliable one. The epistemic luck involved in this case is usually
taken as preventing you from knowing, since you could easily have bought an
unreliable book and been given a false explanation; and, according to a wide-
spread view, when one has knowledge, one’s true belief could not easily have
been false. However, the epistemic luck involved here does not undermine your
understanding. After all, your explanation is correct, you do supposedly have
some grasp of how global warming depends on increasing concentrations of
greenhouse gases and possess some reasons for accepting the explanation pro-
vided, thus possessing the requisite explanatory and justificatory abilities (to
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some extent). This would still be the case if your own book was based on
some inventive guesswork and thus very unreliable, but its explanation was, as a
matter of luck, correct. The luck in this second case is what Pritchard calls
“standard Gettier-style epistemic luck”, that “‘intervenes’ between the agent and
the fact, albeit in such a way that the agent’s belief is true nonetheless” (Pritchard
2010: 36). Hence I am inclined to claim, against Pritchard and with Hills (2010:
196, fn. 13), that explanatory understanding is also compatible with this second
kind of epistemic luck. If this is right, then it becomes even clearer that one can
understand why p without knowing why p. While some have questioned whether
knowledge is really incompatible with environmental epistemic luck (e.g. Grimm
2006: 527–9), it is widely accepted that it is incompatible with standard Gettier-
style epistemic luck.
Further support for the claim that explanatory understanding is compatible
with both types of epistemic luck comes from a consideration by Kvanvig. He
suggests that understanding has a different relationship to epistemic luck than
knowledge due to a difference in focus (Kvanvig 2003: 197; 2009a: 97). When we
think about understanding, we focus on grasping explanatory connections, and
thus, we may add, on possessing certain abilities. When we think about knowl-
edge, we focus on believing a proposition that could not easily have been false,
and thus on non-accidentality. Hence, having acquired the belief in a lucky way
does undermine explanatory knowledge, but having acquired the abilities in a
lucky way does not undermine explanatory understanding. In this respect, under-
standing-why is like knowing-how, which is also compatible with epistemic luck.
When we consider whether someone has know-how, we focus exclusively on
whether he in fact has the ability in question, not on how he acquired it.
In Section 2.1 I argued that explanatory understanding requires grasping
explanatory connections and having good reflectively accessible grounds sup-
porting one’s explanation. Both requirements are epistemically internal, since the
facts which determine that the understanding person satisfies these requirements
are accessible to that person. But explanatory understanding cannot be construed
along purely internalistic lines. In order to understand why p, one’s explanation
must answer to the facts. Like knowledge, understanding is therefore usually
considered factive (Grimm 2006: 518; Pritchard 2010: 75–6; Hills 2010: 190;
Khalifa 2011a: 95). However, whether it is indeed factive depends on how factivity
is defined. If it turns out that understanding is not always factive, this would
constitute a further reason why it is not even a form of knowledge.
According to Hills, explanatory understanding is factive iff you cannot under-
stand why p if “p” is false (Hills 2010: 190). Understanding may indeed be factive
in this sense: You cannot understand why the global temperature has increased if
it has not increased. But the condition is too weak. Consider the factivity of knowl-
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edge that follows from the truth condition. You know why p if you know that p
because q; this implies that “p because q” is true. Hence, explanatory under-
standing seems to be factive iff you cannot understand why p, where you treat q as
the cause or reason why p, but either “p” or “q” is not true, or q is not why p.
However, understanding is not always factive in this sense, since scientific expla-
nations often make use of idealizations. The ideal gas law, for instance, explains
the behaviour of actual gases by describing the behaviour of a gas composed of
perfectly elastic and perfectly spherical point masses that exhibit no mutual
attraction. Such a gas cannot exist. Nonetheless, in circumstances where the
divergence from the ideal is negligible (roughly, in cases of monoatomic gases at a
high temperature and low pressure), the behaviour of actual gases is explained by
reference to the idealization (Elgin 2007: 38). We can only acknowledge that such
explanations provide some explanatory understanding if we admit that it is not
always factive. Non-factive cases are further cases of understanding why p with-
out knowledge why p, since you cannot know why p if “p because q” is not
(strictly) true.
Understanding why p involves a whole set of beliefs which constitute one’s
explanation. Besides the belief that p because q it involves beliefs regarding how p
depends on q and that if q* rather than q were true, then p* rather than p would be
true. The suggested factivity condition does not determine whether all these
further beliefs must be true for explanatory understanding to be factive. This leads
me to objectual understanding, the non-factivity of which I will discuss in some
detail.
3 Objectual understanding
Does objectual understanding somehow reduce to explanatory understanding?
This is the first question I have to address (Sect. 3.1). I then turn to the relation
between objectual understanding and knowledge. Again, cases of knowledge
without objectual understanding show that they are not equivalent (Sect. 3.2);
cases of objectual understanding without knowledge show that the first is not
even a form of the second (Sect. 3.3).
3.1 Objectual and explanatory understanding
Understanding a subject matter involves more than understanding why some fact
involved in it obtains. Besides understanding why it occurs, understanding global
warming involves, for instance, understanding what effects (on natural and social
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systems) it will have, how it is linked to human activities (such as burning fossil
fuels and deforestation) and related phenomena (such as the destruction of strato-
spheric ozone and global dimming), how far greenhouse gas emissions and, as a
result, temperatures are likely to rise in the future, and how the changes will vary
over the globe. A broader understanding of global warming may even involve
instrumental and moral understanding, such as understanding the (dis-)advan-
tages of different responses to climate change (such as mitigation, adaptation and
geo-engineering), andwhat a just distribution of emission rights amounts to.Much
of the involved interrogative understandingmay, on closer inspection, be explana-
tory understanding; understanding how global warming is linked to human activ-
ities, for example, may require an explanation of why its rate is increased by these
activities. This raises the questionwhether we can reduce objectual understanding
of a subject matter to explanatory understanding by conceiving it as understand-
ing why some significant subset of facts or events concerning that subject matter
obtained or occurred (as suggested by Khalifa 2011b).
Such a reduction does not seem to be feasible, for two reasons. First, even if
all the involved interrogative understanding turned out to be explanatory under-
standing, having the explanatory understanding would not be sufficient for hav-
ing objectual understanding. This additionally requires some awareness of how
the different explanations fit into, contribute to, and are justified by reference to
the more comprehensive understanding in which they are embedded. Second,
having explanatory understanding is not even always necessary for having some
objectual understanding, since it is possible to understand a subject matter by
means of a theory that is not explanatory, at least to some extent. Eighteenth-
century biology, conceived of as a pure science of classification with no interest in
explanation but with rigorous criteria of success (Gijsbers 2012), seems to provide
some understanding of the animal kingdom since its classifications reveal signifi-
cant similarities and allow successful predictions (e.g. about whether an animal of
a hitherto unknown species is warm- or cold-blooded). However, this understand-
ing cannot be formulated as understanding why something is the case (e.g. why
some organism has a certain feature or why animals of a certain species exist). Of
course, evolutionary theory has greatly advanced our understanding of the animal
kingdom by providing us with explanations and improving our classifications. But
if classificatory biology gives us at least some understanding, then understanding
without explanation is possible.6
6 This example is due to Gijsbers (2012); further cases of understanding without explanation
have been suggested by Lipton (2009) and critically discussed by Khalifa (2013).
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Typical cases of objectual understanding, however, contain explanatory un-
derstanding. Compared with a single instance of explanatory understanding,
objectual understanding of a subject matter involves grasping more dependence
(and similarity) relations in and by means of a more comprehensive body of
information. The dependence relations can be of various sorts, including relations
between parts or aspects of the subject matter (such as causal, probabilistic,
mereological, supervenience and teleological relations) as well as relations be-
tween elements of the body of information (such as logical, conceptual and
explanatory relations). In our example, this body of information is a full-fledged
theory of global warming or even a complex of theories from different disciplines,
such as climate science, economics and moral philosophy. Again, grasping man-
ifests itself in certain abilities. Understanding global warming involves more of
the same abilities as does understanding its causes: being able to comprehend
and render explanations for a range of facts, draw conclusions from a variety of
information, and judge counterfactual cases with respect to aweb of explanations.
Whether it also involves additional abilities depends also on whether or not the
further interrogative understanding turns out to be explanatory understanding.
Candidates for additional abilities would be, for example, being able to develop
emission scenarios, to use them in order to predict future concentrations of green-
house gases, assess uncertainties in climate model projections and evaluate rival
responses to climate change.
3.2 Knowledge without understanding
Objectual understanding is not identical with knowledge since for each type there
are cases in which one has knowledge but no objectual understanding. It follows
from what has already been said that you can know that and even why a fact
involved in a subject matter S obtains without understanding S. You can even
know all important facts involved in S without understanding S. This is the case if
you know these facts but fail to know how they are related – if, for instance, in
addition to other facts, you know that the global mean temperature has increased
and that concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased, but do not know
that the second fact is the main cause for the first and thus explains it.
It is less clear whether you can know a subject matter S without understand-
ing S. After all, as well as knowing the important facts involved in S, knowing S
involves knowing how they are related. According to Brogaard (2005), this is also
what distinguishes understanding S from simply knowing the facts involved in S.
Hence, she identifies understanding S with knowing S. However, the above
discussion suggests that you can even know S without understanding S. This is
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the case if you know the important facts involved in S and how they are related
but fail to grasp the relations between them, and thus do not have the requisite
explanatory abilities.7
3.3 Understanding without knowledge
Objectual understanding is not even a form of knowledge, since for each type
there are cases in which one has objectual understanding but not knowledge. If
environmental and standard Gettier-style epistemic luck do not undermine your
understanding of the causes of global warming, then they do not undermine your
understanding of global warming either. But they prevent you not only from
knowing that and why the global mean temperature has increased, but also from
having objectual knowledge of global warming. The reason is that we are rightly
inclined to explain knowledge of S in terms of knowledge of the facts involved in
S. Perhaps we can fully explain knowing S in terms of knowing facts; but we
should at least claim that knowing S involves knowing a number of facts consti-
tuting S. Hence, if epistemic luck prevents you from knowing that and why some
fact involved in S obtains, it also prevents you from knowing S. Thinking other-
wise would separate the different types of knowledge too much. The idea behind
this argument is that we should not pull objectual knowledge so far apart from
propositional and explanatory knowledge that we allow that epistemic luck
prevents one from having the last two types of knowledge but not from having
objectual knowledge (Kvanvig 2009a: 100; cf. Kvanvig 2003: 197).
Cases of environmental and of standard Gettier-style epistemic luck are
already rare with respect to individual beliefs; and they are very unlikely with
respect to theories about such complex phenomena as global warming. It is very
unlikely that a book that is the result of some inventive guesswork should provide
an entirely correct account of global warming; or that, while your book about
global warming is reliable, all other books on the subject are very unreliable but
superficially just as scholarly as yours. This is one reason why intuitions about
whether we have understanding or knowledge in such cases vary strongly. Non-
factive cases of objectual understanding are quite frequent and less ambiguous.
Under what conditions should objectual understanding be considered fac-
tive? According to one obvious suggestion, understanding a subject matter S by
7 Following Kvanvig’s terminology, Brogaard (2005) formulates her distinction between know-
ing the facts involved in S and knowing or understanding S in terms of “grasping” explanatory
and other dependence relations. But according to her, grasping explanatory connections between
two facts boils down to correctly believing or knowing that one is the cause or reason of the other.
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means of an account or theory T is factive iff all propositions that constitute T are
true. However, even supporters of the factivity thesis acknowledge that a few
peripheral falsehoods may degrade one’s understanding of a subject matter but
will certainly not undermine it completely. Thus the conditions for objectual
understanding to be factive should be weaker: Understanding a subject matter S
by means of an account or a theory T is factive iff most of the propositions and all
of the central propositions that constitute T are true (Kvanvig 2003: 201–2). This is
vague in two respects. The conditions determine neither how many false proposi-
tions can be tolerated without undermining the understanding, nor which propo-
sitions count as central and which as peripheral. This vagueness gives ample
scope to rescue the factivity of understanding. Nonetheless, as Elgin (2007: 36–9)
has argued, there are two kinds of clear cases in which objectual understanding is
not factive. Both assume that we should construe our concept of understanding in
such a way that we can acknowledge that science admits at least some under-
standing of the phenomena it is concerned with. In what follows, I reconstruct
Elgin’s arguments and defend them against objections raised by Kvanvig.
Firstly, understanding is more gradual than supporters of the factivity thesis
think, since even falsehoods that are rather central sometimes only decrease the
degree of understanding but do not destroy it completely.8 In everyday learning
processes as well as in scientific education, we work from characterizations that
are strictly false but which properly direct us towards the phenomena to beliefs
that are closer to the truth. Even if the development results in true beliefs, an
earlier step also displays at least some understanding. The same pattern is shown
by sequences of scientific theories. Think of a Ptolemaic, a Copernican and a
contemporary theory of the motion of the planets. Despite the fact that Copernicus
falsely assumed that the Earth travels around the sun in a circular orbit, the
theory it belongs to constitutes a major advance in understanding compared to
the Ptolemaic theory. We can only acknowledge that Copernicus has at least some
understanding of the motion of the planets if we admit that even some rather
central falsehoods lower the degree of understanding but do not undermine it
completely, if they are in the right neighbourhood. Moreover, even current scien-
tific theories do not largely consist of truths with a few relatively insignificant
8 Kvanvig maintains that where you have some understanding of a subject matter, even if some
propositions within your account are false, the false propositions are not part of your under-
standing (Kvanvig 2003: 201–2). However, in the given case, the falsehoods are rather central.
This means that they bear evidential, explanatory and other dependence relations to other
propositions within your account. As a result, it is difficult to see in what sense we can talk about
the understanding one has of a subject matter once one has “subtracted” these falsehoods from
the account that constitutes one’s understanding (cf. Riggs 2009: 335).
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falsehoods at the periphery. Hence, we can only acknowledge that current science
exhibits at least some understanding of the phenomena it is concerned with if we
allow that understanding is not always factive.
Kvanvig objects that in such cases we use “understanding” in an honorific
sense, just as we use “knowledge”whenwe speak of “the current state of scientific
knowledge”, while conceding that some part of it may be false. But honorific
usages of epistemic terms, as Kvanvig maintains, belong to the pragmatics rather
than to the semantics of epistemic terminology. Just as honorific uses of “knowl-
edge” have no bearing on what knowledge is, honorific uses of “understanding”
have no bearing on what understanding is (Kvanvig 2009b: 341–2). However, this
analogy does not seem to be compelling. In ordinary usage, we retract a claim to
know a proposition if we discover that it is false. Hence, it is reasonable to
construe propositional, and, by extension, objectual knowledge as factive. But our
ordinary usage of “understanding” as applied to a subject matter is more flexible.
We readily agree that Copernicus did not know that the Earth’s orbit is circular,
but it seems inappropriate to deny him any understanding of the motion of the
planets. We typically acknowledge that people can have some understanding
even if some rather central propositions of their account diverge somewhat from
the truth. Hence, it is reasonable to construe understanding (of some subject
matter) as non-factive.
Secondly, as already mentioned, science often makes use of idealizations.
Physicists purport to understand the behaviour of actual gases by reference to the
ideal gas law; environmental scientists purport to have some understanding of
global warming by reference to simplified climate models. The idealizations are,
strictly speaking, false, but they can neither be eliminated from scientific theories
nor banished to their periphery. Hence, we can only acknowledge that science
exhibits an understanding of the phenomena it is concerned with if we admit that
idealizations do not destroy it. Some approximations are accepted simply because
they are the best that science can currently do, others are preferable to the
complicated truth they approximate; hence, in contrast to the falsehoods men-
tioned in the first cases, they do not even lower the degree of understanding. This
implies that truth is only one of many epistemic desiderata which understanding
should realise, and that it can be overridden by others, such as generality,
simplicity, parsimony, explanatory power and applicability.9
9 The relative weights of these epistemic desiderata also depend on pragmatic considerations.
Applicability, for instance, is more important than parsimony, if we are striving for an account
that can directly be utilized in practice.
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Kvanvig objects that idealizations will not imply non-factivity once we ap-
preciate that the object of understanding is not simply the model itself but
involves a relationship between model and reality, including information about
the extent to which the model is an idealization and what aspects of reality it is
intended to shed light on (Kvanvig 2009b: 342–3; cf. Greco 2012: 126–7). However,
the object of understanding is neither the model nor the model and its relation to
reality, but rather the phenomenon in the world. Such an understanding presup-
poses an understanding of the model in question combined with an awareness
that it is an idealization. But it does not always seem to include knowledge of
precisely how the model diverges from reality. Otherwise it would be difficult to
see what the point of the idealization is. Environmental scientists do not know
exactly how their climate models diverge from reality; but this does not comple-
tely undermine their understanding of global warming.
In a case of non-factive understanding, some of the central propositions
constituting your account of S may be false; if so, you may have some under-
standing of S without knowing all central facts involved in S, and, indeed, with-
out knowing S. Here is an argument why – which is, again, based on the idea that
the different types of knowledge should not be separated from each other too
much. Objectual understanding is not factive; propositional knowledge is factive.
If one takes some types of knowledge as factive and others as not factive, this
separates them too much. Hence, objectual knowledge should be considered
factive. But then there are further cases of objectual understanding that do not
entail objectual knowledge.
4 Characteristics of understanding
As a result of my discussion, important characteristics of explanatory and objec-
tual understanding have emerged which distinguish them from different types of
knowledge.
(a) Explanatory and objectual understanding are gradual. They can vary in
breadth, depth and accuracy (and perhaps in other ways as well). The scientist’s
understanding of global warming and its causes is broader and deeper than your
understanding since she grasps more dependence relations and more basic ones
in and by means of a more comprehensive body of information. Her understand-
ing is more accurate since most of her beliefs are true or at least close to the truth,
while some of your beliefs are still more or less the crude characterizations of a
novice. In contrast, propositional and minimal explanatory knowledge (i.e.
knowledge that p because q) are not gradual at all, good explanatory and
objectual knowledge are not gradual to the same extension in the third dimen-
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sion; because of the factivity condition, most of the propositions and all central
propositions of the account must be true.
(b) Explanatory and objectual understanding are no species of belief, since
they involve a whole set of beliefs; they are not even fully explicable as collections
of beliefs, since, beside beliefs, they involve grasping dependence relations and
thus call upon certain abilities. Furthermore, understanding need not be couched
in true beliefs; it might equally well be located in apt categories and effective
non-verbal symbols, such as diagrams, graphs and three-dimensional models. In
contrast, propositional and minimal explanatory knowledge are species of belief;
good explanatory and objectual knowledge can be explained as collections of
beliefs.
(c) Explanatory and objectual understanding are not always factive. An ex-
planation of why p and an account of a subject matter S can be more or less
accurate and may essentially include idealizations. In both cases, the vehicle
involves propositions that are not strictly true, and some of them may even be
central to the explanation or account. In contrast, knowledge is undermined by
(non-peripheral) falsehoods. Knowing that p implies that “p” is true, knowing
why p implies that “p because q” is true, and knowing S implies that most of the
propositions and all the central propositions of the account of S are true. How-
ever, understanding is also some sort of cognitive success. Hence, even though it
is not factive, it has to answer to the facts. As a consequence, understanding is not
transparent: Thinking that one understands why p or a subject matter S does not
entail that one understands why p or S.
(d) Explanatory and objectual understanding have an internalistic dimension.
Besides grasping dependence relations and the abilities involved in it, they require
good reflectively accessible grounds in support of one’s explanation or account,
and thus theability to justify it. Both requirements are internal to cognitionbecause
they do not depend on factors outside the control of the person who possesses the
understanding. In contrast, propositional and explanatory knowledge may, by
epistemically externalist lights at least, sometimes be opaque to the subject.
(e) Explanatory and objectual understanding are related to a plurality of
epistemic desiderata. They demand an epistemic value pluralism, according to
which truth is only one of many epistemic desiderata and can be overridden by
others. Categories and non-verbal symbols are epistemically more or less appro-
priate, even though they are neither true nor false; idealizations can be epistemi-
cally valuable although they are known to be false. In contrast, propositional
knowledge admits of an account that takes truth to be the sole or at least the
highest epistemic desideratum. If such an epistemic value monism acknowledges
other epistemic desiderata besides truth, then it claims that they are desiderata
only insofar as they facilitate our reaching the truth (cf. Brogaard 2009: 284).
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(f) Explanatory and objectual understanding are compatible with epistemic
luck. They are neither undermined by environmental epistemic luck nor by stan-
dard Gettier-style epistemic luck. The reason for this is that what is distinctive
about understanding, once the answering-the-facts requirement is satisfied, is
internal to cognition: the grasping of connections and justifying of the commit-
ments that undergird one’s understanding and thus the possessing of certain
abilities. Since possessing the abilities is not undermined by epistemic luck,
understanding is not undermined either. In contrast, knowledge is usually con-
sidered to be incompatible with epistemic luck. The reason is that what is distinc-
tive about knowledge, once the truth condition (and, maybe, a justification condi-
tion) is satisfied, is external to cognition: the non-accidentality of the connection
between mind and world and thus that one’s true (and justified) belief could not
have easily been false. Since your beliefs could have easily been false in cases of
epistemic luck, the luck prevents you from knowing (cf. Kvanvig 2003: 197).
These six characteristics do not directly lead to definitions of the concepts of
explanatory and of objectual understanding, but they provide guidelines for
such definitions. According to (a), the definiens and the definiendum have to be
construed as gradual. According to (b), the definiendum has to include a grasping
condition that should be spelled out in terms of possessing certain abilities. I have
specified the abilities required for explanatory understanding, and indicated by
way of an example what kind of abilities objectual understanding may addition-
ally involve. In the case of symbolic understanding, one can grasp explanatory
and other dependence relations within an explanation or account without com-
mitting oneself to them. However, factual understanding of something by means
of the explanation or account presupposes that one commits oneself to the
explanation or account, including its non-propositional elements (see Sect. 1).
Hence, the grasping condition has to be supplemented by a commitment con-
dition, which corresponds to the belief condition for propositional knowledge.
According to (c), the definiendum must include an answering-the-facts condition
that corresponds to the truth condition for knowledge; according to (d) it must
include a justification condition that must be construed along epistemically inter-
nalistic lines. While justification in connection with knowledge is conceived of
as truth-conducive, understanding according to (e) requires a justification that
is related to a plurality of epistemic desiderata. However, (f) implies that the
definiendum does not need a further external anti-luck condition besides the
epistemically internal justification condition.
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5 Propositional understanding
I have argued, first, that neither explanatory understanding nor objectual under-
standing are forms of knowledge. On the onehand, it is possible to have knowledge
without having explanatory or objectual understanding, since in contrast to knowl-
edge they require the grasping of dependence relations in a way that involves
having certain abilities aswell as reflectively accessible grounds in support of one’s
explanation or account. On the other hand, it is possible to have explanatory or
objectual understanding without having knowledge, since, in contrast to knowl-
edge, they are not always factive and are compatiblewith epistemic luck. Second, I
have argued that objectual understanding is not reducible to explanatory under-
standing. Having explanatory understanding is not sufficient for objectual under-
standing since this additionally involves some awareness of how the explanatory
understanding fits into and is justified by reference to the more comprehensive
understanding in which it is embedded. Having explanatory understanding is not
always necessary for having objectual understanding since one can have some
objectual understanding by means of a theory that is not explanatory. But is ex-
planatory understanding not a form of propositional understanding? And, if it is,
would this not pave theway for reducing explanatory understanding to propositio-
nal knowledge nonetheless? These are the questions I address in this final section.
The reduction starts from two widespread claims. One takes explanatory
understanding to be a form of propositional understanding; the other identifies
propositional understanding (excluding hedging and moderating usages) with
propositional knowledge:
(11) Understanding why p is equivalent to understanding that q is a correct
answer to the why-question (cf. Kvanvig 2003: 189–90).10
(12) Understanding that p is equivalent to knowing that p (cf. Elgin 2007: 34;
Grimm 2011: 85).
Since we can substitute “that p” in (12) by “that q is a correct answer to the why-
question” from (11), (11) and (12) together imply:
(13) Understanding why p is equivalent to knowing that q is a correct answer to
the why-question.
10 A more orthodox formulation is: (11*) Understanding why p is equivalent to understanding
that q, where q is a correct answer to the why-question. However, (11*) seems obviously false. You
do not understand why p if you understand that q, but fail to see that q is a correct answer to the
question why p (cf. Brogaard 2005).
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The reduction claim (13) is attractive since it suggests a possibility of explaining
the elusive notion of explanatory understanding in terms of the much better
understood notion of propositional knowledge.
However, if my argument is sound and explanatory understanding is neither
identical with nor a form of knowledge, then (13) fails. You can know that q is a
correct answer to the question why p without understanding why p if you fail to
have the requisite explanatory and justificatory abilities. You can even under-
stand why p without knowing q as a correct answer to the question why p, for
example if q involves some idealization. If (13) fails, then either (11) or (12) or both
of them have to be given up.
I think (11) should be rejected, since reducing explanatory understanding to
propositional understanding faces a dilemma. Either the propositional under-
standing is construed in such a way that its content is exhausted by a proposition
concerning what the causes or reasons for p are, or it is construed in a much more
demanding way. If the content of the propositional understanding is exhausted
by a proposition concerning what the causes or reasons for p are, then the pro-
posed reduction is impossible. Besides knowing a proposition to the effect that p
because q, understanding why p additionally involves some grasp of how p
depends on the causes or reasons specified in q and thus on the explanatory
abilities (i)–(iii), as specified in Section 2.1. This problem could be solved by
construing propositional understanding very demandingly so that it involves a
conjunctive proposition, including propositions about how p depends on q, and
that if q* rather than q were true then p* rather than p would be true, as well as
the requisite explanatory and justificatory abilities. If propositional understand-
ing is construed in a such a demanding way, then the proposed reduction is
unhelpful. Propositional understanding is then no better understood than expla-
natory understanding; so reducing the second to the first does not help us. Thus,
(11) should be rejected, since reducing explanatory to propositional understand-
ing is either impossible or unhelpful.
Giving up (11) makes it possible to stick to (12) and to identify propositional
understanding with propositional knowledge, a claim that is accepted by almost
all participants in the debate on understanding. As a result, there is no need for
an extra definition of the concept of propositional understanding. We have only
to search for definitions of the concepts of explanatory understanding and of
objectual understanding. One of the aims of this paper was to specify the condi-
tions any such definition should include.11
11 I would like to thank audiences in Kirchberg, Dresden and Zurich, and in particular Monika
Betzler, Georg Brun, Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn, Peter Schaber, Pedro Schmechtig as well an
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